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oftware is nearly everywhere today: in our smartphones, our cars, our offices and our 
homes. But it has been estimated that the average programme has at least 14 separate 
points of vulnerability. Each of those weaknesses could permit an attacker to compromise 
the integrity of the product and potentially make an illicit entry. What can we do to protect 
ourselves? Who should look for vulnerabilities and should the vendors or the users be informed 
about them? 
The debate on how to handle the disclosure of insecurities pre-dates software security. It can 
be traced back to the locksmiths and lock-picking in England in the 1850s. In his book The 
Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of Locks, locksmith Alfred Hobbes argued that “it is 
to the interest of honest persons to know about [insecurities], because the dishonest are 
tolerably certain to be the first to apply the knowledge practically”. And for decades now, this 
issue has been the subject of broad debate in the information security arena.  
Recent events, however, have created a new sense of urgency on this issue. The ransomware 
attacks from Wannacry took advantage of a vulnerability in Microsoft software discovered by 
the National Security Agency (NSA) and leaked by a group of hackers called Shadow Brokers. 
Such incidents focus critical attention on the widespread activity of stockpiling vulnerabilities 
by national intelligence agencies around the world. Moreover, with the development of the 
Internet of Things and billions of devices connected to the internet, the attack surface is 
becoming broader and the impact of vulnerabilities will be even greater, thereby increasing the 
risks to critical infrastructure.  
‘Vulnerability disclosure’ is the process by which someone shares information about a security 
vulnerability so that it can be mitigated or fixed. Particularly critical are the zero-day 
vulnerabilities, which are undisclosed software vulnerabilities that hackers can exploit to 
adversely affect computer programmes, data, additional computers or a network – and for 
which patches or mitigation do not yet exist.  
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The way to handle this process has generated four types of vulnerability disclosure: full 
disclosure, responsible disclosure, coordinated vulnerability disclosure and no disclosure. While 
full disclosure consists of a public release of all the details of the vulnerabilities, quite often 
without any mitigation measures to protect users, the no disclosure approach represents a way 
for governments or vendors to acquire vulnerabilities for exploitation or advantage at a later 
stage. Both the responsible disclosure and the coordinated vulnerability disclosure aim at 
sharing vulnerabilities information with vendors, but they differ on the degree of the 
coordination process to protect users. Discussants at a recent CEPS cyber event1in Brussels 
emphasised the importance of introducing a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) process 
in Europe, in which finders– individuals or organisations that identify a potential vulnerability 
in a product or online service – share vulnerability information with vendors, and stakeholders 
focus on ways to protect users.  
EU member states have only begun the practical implementation of this process. The Dutch 
government is leading the way with a Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Initiative, through 
the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise. The French agency ASSI is also actively participating. 
Other countries like Italy are catching up in this process through the initiative of the Digital 
Transformation Team. There is a real need for better harmonisation of vulnerabilities disclosure 
and handling the process at the national level, for which the international standards ISO/IEC 
30111:2013 on vulnerability handling processes and 29147:2014 on vulnerability disclosure can 
be useful as a starting point.  
The policy framework that is already developed, however, may also need to be updated in view 
of future technologies such as the Internet of Things. The Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission has extensively studied these issues and is suggesting that research 
should be the main driver for vulnerabilities discovery, while the creation of an EU pilot 
vulnerability management centre, serving as a test-bed platform, could act as an independent 
third party in this process. This role could be played by ENISA, which should have a stronger 
and more focused function in European cybersecurity policy, under the new Cybersecurity 
Strategies to be announced in the autumn. 
But there is quite a lot of ground yet to be covered, especially for the role that governments 
should play in resolving the dilemma between disclosing zero-day vulnerabilities and retaining 
them for intelligence purposes. Only recently has the US government created a vulnerability 
equity process (VEP), which focuses on explaining how the government determines whether to 
release or retain a zero-day vulnerability through a structured policy process. Participants at 
the CEPS event called upon the EU to outline in its forthcoming revised Cybersecurity Strategy 
specific principles for member states to follow in developing a European vulnerability equity 
process with clear priority given to reporting vulnerabilities to vendors. This essential step 
would take the EU far towards a more future-proofed cybersecurity strategy and a more holistic 
cybersecurity ecosystem in Europe.  
                                                     
1 Download the programme and the speakers’ presentations here. 
